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Judgement Day in Heritage Hell 
Heritage practice, policy, and the law in Austria (and beyond)  
 
Raimund Karl 
Bangor University 
Abstract: Two recent higher court findings from Austria show how the Austrian National Heritage 
Agency [BDA] has misinterpreted and misapplied the provisions of § 11 (1) Austrian Monument 
Protection Law. While the BDA has maintained for decades that consent is required under § 11 (1) 
for any fieldwork, even surface surveys, regardless of whether archaeology is known, legal challenge 
has established that neither is the case. Rather, it appears that consent under § 11 (1) is only 
required where there is evidence that significant archaeology will be found during the fieldwork. 
Furthermore, § 11 (1) only applies to sub-surface fieldwork or under-water evidence. As a 
consequence, as many as c.10,000 permits may have been granted illegally, with potentially costly 
conditions attached. This paper examines the court findings, their consequences for Austrian 
archaeological heritage management, the reasons why the BDA misinterpreted the law and reflects 
on the wider implications.  
Keywords: Austria, monuments protection law, archaeology, fieldwork permit, court findings 
--- 
Introduction 
How access to archaeological evidence in situ for purposes of research [fieldwork] is managed varies 
between countries; but generally sits somewhere between two extremes.  
The first could be described as the ’German‘ or ’national patrimony‘ model.1 Access rights are 
managed restrictively, to the extent that any fieldwork in situ is only permitted by license or permit 
issued by a state (or national) heritage agency and typically restricted to archaeology graduates. In 
extreme cases, a heritage agency (or more precisely, its lawyers in legal commentaries) may claim 
legal privilege for the state through its heritage agency to conduct any research in situ. ‘Private’ 
fieldwork is generally prohibited and is only permitted in exceptional cases.2 
The second is the ’British‘ or ’social license‘ model.3 Access rights are managed liberally under this 
model, with an official permit only required for works which affect designated archaeological sites.4 
On most other land, no official permit is required and there is no restriction of fieldwork, beyond the 
landowner’s consent. 
In this third instalment of what I have termed the heritage hell series,5 I revisit the Austrian situation, 
and particularly § 11 (1) of the Denkmalschutzgesetz [DMSG] 1923 (Austrian Heritage Protection 
Law), in the light of two recent and significant court findings on the matter of ‘excavation’ or 
‘research permits’. Austria serves as a case study to highlight wider issues, regarding the 
interpretation and application of heritage laws by state or national heritage agencies. Such issues – 
though perhaps in less extreme form than in Austria – can and do exist in some other countries and 
highlight how (the) international authorised heritage discourse(s) [AHD]6 can severely influence the 
interpretation of heritage laws and the development of national or state heritage management 
policies and practices. 
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The Austrian situation: the official interpretation by the BDA 
I have provided a general summary of Austrian archaeological heritage protection law in a previous 
paper,7 and thus will not repeat this here. Rather, I will jump directly to the legal provision which 
(once again) particularly concerns me in this paper, namely § 11 (1) DMSG, which regulates 
archaeological fieldwork in situ. Until recently the Austrian National Heritage Agency, the 
Bundesdenkmalamt [BDA], has maintained that any archaeological fieldwork in situ would require a 
permit according to § 11 (1) issued by it to be legal.8 Most recently, it has restated this explicitly in its 
official Richtlinien für archäologische Maßnahmen (Guidelines for Archaeological Measures),9 which 
it attaches as a firm condition to any permit it grants: 
“A precondition for the initiation of any excavations »and other research in situ for the purpose 
of finding and investigating moveable and immovable monuments« (§ 11 (1) DMSG) is the 
existence of a permitting decision of the BDA according to § 11 (1) DMSG.” 10.11 
The BDA has also consistently maintained that such a permit is required regardless of whether any 
archaeology is known or suspected to exist where the fieldwork is to be conducted; and that this 
requirement extends to any kind of archaeological fieldwork, regardless of its impact on the 
archaeological resource. Thus, in its official Guidelines, it lists non-invasive methods like the purely 
visual inspection of the landscape for surface features12 and geophysical surveys13 as requiring such a 
permit. It also, since § 11 (1) explicitly states that such permits can only be issued to archaeology 
graduates, restricts them strictly to individuals who have completed a relevant academic degree. 
This official interpretation of the provisions of § 11 (1) DMSG by the National Heritage Agency firmly 
puts Austria into the ’German‘ model of managing fieldwork in situ. It is extremely restrictive in 
limiting fieldwork consent to archaeology graduates, and falling just short of claiming legal privilege 
for the BDA alone to conduct fieldwork.14 
Could the law be interpreted differently? 
I presented the official interpretation in my previous papers on § 11 (1) DMSG in HEN 2/2,15 hinting 
at my doubts over this interpretation in HEN 7/4,16 and more forcefully elsewhere.17 
Suffice to say Austrian law can be interpreted quite differently and my own interpretation of § 11 (1) 
differs radically from that presented above; for several reasons. 
If quoted in full, the relevant first sentence of § 11 (1) DMSG reads: 
“Research by changing the ground or the ground beneath water (excavation) and other 
research in situ with the purpose of finding and investigating moveable and immoveable 
monuments beneath the surface of the ground or water is only allowed with a permit by the 
National Heritage Agency, unless § 11 (2) and (9) stipulate different conditions (research 
excavation).” (§ 11 (1) DMSG; emphasis: RK).18 
My emphasis highlights my first disagreement with the official interpretation of this clause by the 
BDA19: the law explicitly states that the purpose of the fieldwork must be to discover (or investigate) 
evidence located beneath the surface of the ground or water. Thus, it seems legally impossible that 
fieldwork to recover surface finds (field artefact collection) should be subject to this provision.  
More significantly, though, the law uses the term monuments, that is, Denkmale, rather than using 
the more specific term used elsewhere in the DMSG for archaeology, Bodendenkmale. While this 
may seem like a very minor distinction, and indeed seemed sufficiently minor to the BDA that in its 
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printed 2nd, 3rd and 4th editions of its official Guidelines, it misquoted the law by replacing the former 
with the latter,20 it is highly significant. This is because the two terms are defined in the law quite 
differently. Bodendenkmale is defined as objects which “… could obviously be subject to the 
restrictions of this law” (§ 8 (1) DMSG, emphasis: RK)21 whilst Denkmale is defined in the first 
sentence of the law, which also defines the limits of the applicability of the law itself: 
“The provisions contained in this law are applicable to manmade, moveable or immovable 
objects (including their remains and traces of formative human adaptation as well as 
artificially created or shaped soil formations) of historical, artistic or other cultural significance 
(“monuments”), provided that due to this significance, their preservation is in the public 
interest.” (§ 1 (1) DMSG, emphasis: RK).22 
The provision of § 1 (1), much like that of § 11 (1), contains a condition restricting its applicability, 
and that of the law in general, to a specific subset of entities defined as ’monuments‘: those whose 
preservation is in the public interest. The definition of the term Bodendenkmale in § 8 (1), on the 
other hand, is very wide and includes all objects which could be ‘monuments’.  
This is particularly significant since the DMSG, in § 1 (2), determines what conditions must be met 
for the preservation of an object to be in the public interest; and in § 1 (4) states that for public 
interest to become legally effective, it must be scheduled according to the procedures set out in §§ 
2, 2a or 3. This implies that for the DMSG to be applicable, the object affected must be a scheduled 
monument. If that interpretation of the provisions of § 11 (1) and § 1 (1) in conjunction were 
correct, the management of fieldwork in situ would be entirely different from the BDA’s 
interpretation.  
Rather than applying to all fieldwork in situ, the requirement for consent by the BDA would be 
limited strictly to fieldwork in situ on scheduled monuments.23 Thus, Austria would fall into the 
“British” model, where fieldwork could be carried out anywhere outside scheduled areas, provided 
there was landowner consent. 
My interpretation, rather than that of the BDA, is supported by the Austrian government’s official 
explanatory report on the draft bill for the latest major revision of the DMSG (the 
Regierungsvorlage) in 1999. It stated that heritage management can only function effectively if 
restricted to a limited number of scheduled monuments.24  
Two court cases on the issue of research permits 
In 2017, the interpretation of § 11 (1) and § 1 (1) was tested in the courts. One case was brought by 
myself at the Bundesverwaltungsgericht ([BVwG] the Austrian Federal Administrative Court of 
Appeals), the other a case brought by the BDA against an Austrian citizen who conducted what it 
considered to be an illegal excavation, at the Verwaltungsgerichtshof ([VwGH]; Austrian Supreme 
Administrative Court). I will discuss them in that order, even though chronologically, the latter 
predates the former, a point I will return to later. 
Finding of the BVwG, dated 11.9.2017 [case no: W183 2168814-1/2E] 
The case I brought started with an ethical dilemma: I had been asked by the charity ArchaeoPublica 
to give a presentation about the requirements under Austrian law regarding fieldwork at a workshop 
for interested citizens on archaeological land surveying in Linz on 7-8 April 2017. During the 
preparation for this, I (once again) stumbled across the contradiction between the letter of the law 
and the Guidelines of the BDA25 noted above. This turned an otherwise academic matter into a real 
problem. I had to explain their rights and responsibilities under the law to members of the public; 
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yet the BDA’s interpretation of what those were differed considerably from my own. While that was 
easy enough to resolve – I simply explained both interpretations and advised the audience to stick 
with the BDA’s to be safe – it was an uncomfortable position to be in. I thus decided that this matter 
needed to be resolved. 
Having once again confirmed with the head of archaeology at the BDA that I had not misunderstood 
their Guidelines;26 I proceeded on 9 April 2017 to explain my legal opinion to him (and thus by proxy, 
the legal department of the BDA) in a strongly worded letter. This was accompanied by an 
application for a survey to collect surface finds in my parent’s garden in Vienna, designed and 
explained explicitly as a test case. I also demanded they change their policy, practice, and Guidelines; 
since I believed they were acting without any legal basis in making § 11 (1) DMSG-permits a 
requirement for surface surveys.  
The latter is an important point: Austria is a democratic republic, based on the rule of law. As such, 
the principle that “All public administration must only be exercised according to the law” (Art. 18 (1) 
Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG])27 is explicitly enshrined in its constitution. The BDA thus must not 
apply any policies or practices for which there is no legal basis: any administrative action without 
such a legal basis is necessarily unconstitutional and, as such, illegal.28 
My demand that such changes should be made was not heeded. The BDA instead proceeded to a 
decision on my application despite the fact that I had explicitly stated in the accompanying letter I 
was only looking for surface finds, did not anticipate that I would discover any “moveable 
monuments” and that nothing of any significance had ever been found on that plot of land; not even 
during the construction of my parent's house – my childhood home – in the 1970s. I, therefore, 
expected that the BDA would decline my application as beyond its jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless the BDA granted me the permit and, as always in such cases, attached numerous 
conditions, including that my survey would need to be conducted in compliance with its official 
Guidelines.29 It also made it conditional that I had to ensure that sufficient funding was available for 
the conservation of any finds made, their scholarly assessment, the preservation of any immoveable 
Bodendenkmale discovered and any restoration works required in situ. This is particularly 
remarkable, since even owners of actually scheduled monuments are only required by law to 
maintain their property in sound condition, for example by replacing broken windows or roofing 
slates. There is no legal basis to compel anyone to carry out (or fund) so-called active conservation 
measures, let alone restorations, anywhere in the DMSG.30 
This gave me sufficient grounds to appeal the decision. My appeal was mainly based on the 
argument outlined above, even though I added a host of other arguments as to why it was illegal for 
the BDA to have granted me this permit. Also, in case the BVwG were to uphold the right of the BDA 
to grant this permit, I appealed against most of the conditions the BDA had attached to it.  
On 11.9.2017, Judge Erika Pieler31 found in my favour, rejecting the need for my application as it lay 
outside the jurisdiction of the BDA. The judge gave three main reasons for her finding:  
Firstly, § 11 (1) DMSG explicitly states that a permit was required for research for monuments 
beneath the surface of the ground, and my application explicitly stated that I intended to only collect 
surface finds. Thus, the provisions of § 11 (1) could not be applied to my application.  
Secondly, there was a finding by the VwGH (dated 24.6.1985, case no: 84/12/0213)32 which had 
clearly established that the provisions of § 11 (1) could not be applied to the collection of surface 
finds. While this had been found under an earlier version of the DMSG, it still was applicable, since 
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the precise wording of § 11 (1) did not include the condition beneath [etc.] at the time of this 
finding. Rather, this had only been added in 1990. 
Thirdly, a recent finding by the VwGH (discussed below) had determined it was a necessary 
precondition for the applicability of § 11 (1) that there was evidence that it was at least probable 
that monuments were present in situ and would be discovered during fieldwork. Yet, since I had 
stated in my application that I did not expect to discover monuments, and all available evidence 
indicated none whatsoever were present in situ, § 11 (1) was also inapplicable in this case. 
The judge also found the case unfit for further appeal, since the law was clear, as was Supreme 
Court judicature, and thus there were no remaining questions justifying an appeal to the VwGH.  
In effect, the Judge declared that there was no legal basis for applying § 11 (1) to surveys intended 
to discover surface finds, and any issuing of permits for such activities by the BDA in violation of Art. 
18 B-VG and thus illegal.  
Finding of the VwGH, dated 23.2.2017 [case no: Ro 2016/09/0008] 
It is remarkable that Judge Pieler, in her finding, had had to remind the BDA of this recent finding by 
the VwGH, which had been issued less than two months before I had submitted my application. Its 
implications for managing fieldwork are huge and everyone in the BDA’s law and archaeology 
departments should have been aware of its existence and the consequences for policy and practice. 
The case which led to this judgement originated when the BDA reported a citizen to the prosecuting 
authority, the Bezirkshauptmannschaft Liezen (the local county council), for conducting an 
excavation without a permit according to § 11 (1) DMSG. He had conducted fieldwork on a 
prehistoric copper mine dump by excavating a few small trenches some 50cm deep, to extract 
samples for scientific analysis. The county council found his actions in violation of § 11 (1) and fined 
him €1,000 for this administrative offence. Believing he had done nothing wrong, the offender 
appealed at the Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark (Styrian State Administrative Court of 
Appeals). He argued that the mine dump was not a monument according to § 1 (1) DMSG, but rather 
a natural soil formation; and that, thus, the provisions of § 11 (1) were inapplicable. The Styrian 
court found in his favour and quashed the fine; allowing a further appeal to the VwGH to the local 
council. In its finding on that second stage appeal, the VwGH found that the Styrian court had 
erroneously accepted the offender’s argument that the mine dump was a natural soil formation. 
Thus, it referred the case back to the Styrian court, with the instruction that it would have to 
determine whether the specific mine dump in question is a monument to which the provisions of § 
11 (1) can apply. 
The county council in its appeal had also requested, as is possible under Austrian law, that the VwGH 
determine the circumstances that constitute the element for the purpose of finding and 
investigating of the offence, what criteria were to be used to determine whether it had been 
fulfilled, and when ‘purposefulness’ of such an action could be assumed. The VwGh heeded that 
request by extracting two legal rules (Rechtssätze) from its finding. In Austrian civil law, legal rules 
are similar to precedent in common law systems. Published separately from the finding, they 
determine how a particular aspect of the law is to be interpreted. 
The first of them states that for § 11 (1) DMSG to be applicable at all, the monument to be 
investigated must be already known or that it was the intention of the investigation to lead to the 
discovery of a monument. The second is much more interesting, since it specifies that it is not just 
the subjective intent of the researcher which determines whether § 11 (1) applies. Rather, the 
objective criterion whether there is any specific evidence that monuments are present in situ 
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beneath the surface must also be considered. Obviously, in case of investigation of a monument 
positively known to the researcher, foreknowledge would be a given. In case of the intended 
discovery of monuments, however, at least some evidence must support the probability of 
discovery. Examples of such evidence cited by the VwGH include publicly accessible expert 
testimonies, publicly accessible sources, or ongoing scheduling procedures. It concludes by stating 
that the significance of a monument is determined by its appreciation by the academic community 
and that it is a necessary precondition for the applicability of the DMSG that a monument is present 
or in case of § 11 (1) that there is at least an expectation of finds. 
While leaving somewhat more room for interpretation than the finding of the BVwG, it is still clear 
that this finding has important implications for managing fieldwork in situ. The BDA’s jurisdiction in 
applying § 11 (1) is restricted to fieldwork on sites that have generated some evidence that 
archaeological monuments will be found. If generously interpreting the VwGH’s inclusion of “other 
publicly accessible sources”, this could refer to published reports of stray finds, or surface features 
indicating the presence of archaeology. It would mean that, since the BDA is required by § 11 (7) 
DMSG to publish an annual report of all relevant finds made in Austria, the Fundberichte aus 
Österreich [FÖ], fieldwork on any site reported in past issues of the FÖ could be subject to § 11 (1). In 
absolute numbers, that would mean an estimated c.50,000 archaeological find spots in Austria;33 
though more recently, Picker et al. have given a much lower figure of 19,550 sites known to the 
BDA.34 
However, that would still not change the finding by the VwGH which requires the BDA to radically 
change its policy, practice and guidance regarding the applicability of § 11 (1) DMSG. After all, even if 
this interpretation were correct, it is certainly not ‘any’ fieldwork in situ which requires a permit by 
the BDA, despite the BDA maintaining this position for decades.35 Rather, it is only fieldwork on 
known or suspected archaeological sites which requires such a permit. Assuming that on average, 
each site known to the BDA covers an area of c.1 hectare, that would mean such a permit would only 
be required for fieldwork on c. 0.5% of the total Austrian landmass. Everywhere else, no § 11 (1) 
permit can be required, and thus anyone may freely conduct fieldwork as they see fit, as long as they 
have landowner consent. 
Thus, even in the ‘best case’ scenario, Austria would have to be considered to be nowhere near the 
‘German’ model for managing fieldwork in situ, but rather closer to the ‘British’ model, even if 
somewhat less liberal. Yet, there are indeed a number of good reasons to believe that the finding of 
the VwGH has to be interpreted much more strictly. 
First, the VwGH interprets the applicability of § 11 (1) teleologically by unequivocally linking it to the 
definition of the aims and applicability of the DMSG in § 1 (1). And, as already highlighted above, 
that limits its applicability to monuments whose preservation is in the public interest. But since that 
public interest only becomes legally effective by scheduling, this implies that none of the provisions 
of the DMSG, including those of § 11 (1), can be applied to non-scheduled archaeological sites. 
Second, § 37 (6) DMSG stipulates that if during an ongoing prosecution or court case the BDA 
decides that there is no or has never been a public interest in the preservation of the affected 
monument the case must be dropped. This also applies to criminal damage proceedings according to 
§ 126 (1.3) Strafgesetzbuch (Austrian Penal Code). While commentaries suggest that this is 
misguided legal policy,36 it is an inevitable consequence assuming the legislator intended the 
applicability of the DMSG to be strictly limited to monuments whose preservation is in the public 
interest. And that is exceedingly likely, since it indeed explicitly stated exactly this in § 1 (1). 
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, the DMSG also contains a provision creating the potential to 
schedule monuments whose significance cannot yet be conclusively determined. In § 1 (5), it states 
that if a monument has not been sufficiently researched, as in case of as yet unexcavated 
archaeology, it can still be scheduled if the current state of research indicates it is at least probable 
that it fulfils the legal criteria for scheduling. Thus a lower than normal standard of evidence is 
permissible for scheduling, specifically for unexcavated archaeological monuments. 
This provision was first introduced in the 1990 revision of the DMSG (then numbered § 1 (2)),37 
specifically with the aim to satisfy Austria’s legal obligation under Art. 2 (b) of the London 
Convention, “to create reserve zones for the preservation of material evidence to be excavated by 
later generations of archaeologists”.38 In the government’s explanatory report to the bill for the 
1990 revision, these reserve zones are referred to as “Fundhoffnungsgebiete”,39 which, as literally as 
possible, translates into English as ‘find expectation areas’.  
Yet, the finding of the VwGH makes an ‘expectation of finds’ a precondition for the applicability of § 
11 (1) and lists as examples of the kind of evidence required to create such an expectation exactly 
those which would be required for scheduling, like expert testimonies. It thus follows that, if such an 
expectation must exist for § 11 (1) to be triggered, the site on which fieldwork is to be conducted 
must be such a find expectation area. Yet, the legislator has foreseen the need to protect such find 
expectation areas by law and regulated the situation through § 1 (5), allowing sites to be scheduled 
with a lower than normal standard of evidence. This again implies that a site must be scheduled for 
the provisions of § 11 (1) to apply; or at least be in the process of being scheduled, the second 
example the VwGH lists as sufficient evidential support to create the necessary ‘expectation of finds’. 
This makes it exceedingly unlikely that this finding can be interpreted to arrive at the ‘best case’ 
scenario. Instead, the more likely interpretation means the ‘worst case’ for the BDA, with § 11 (1) 
applicable exclusively to land either containing scheduled monuments; in the process of being 
scheduled; or, at the very least, where publicly available expert testimony indicates the probability 
that significant finds will be discovered. This effectively restricts the applicability of § 11 (1) to 
fieldwork on scheduled monuments and World Heritage sites, since these currently are the only 
ones in Austria for which expert testimony determining their significance exists. In absolute 
numbers, this would be at least c.1,100, and perhaps up to as many as c.1,500, archaeological sites. 
In comparison to England, which has about 1.5 times the landmass of Austria, where c.17,500 
archaeological monuments are scheduled,40 the numbers are woefully low.  
Arguably, the finding does not de jure restrict the applicability of § 11 (1) to scheduled monuments 
only: it does leave the possibility of publishing expert testimony indicating that a non-scheduled site 
does meet the legal criteria for scheduling. This would apply even if the site was not yet in the 
process of being scheduled. Thus, in the future, more sites could be brought within the jurisdiction 
of § 11 (1) DMSG than there are scheduled sites. Although this does not necessarily resolve the 
Austrian situation it does bring it much closer to the ‘British’ model.  
The consequences of the two findings 
The main consequence of the first case is that the BDA will no longer subject surface surveys to § 11 
(1) DMSG. I have been provided with a copy of an internal email informing staff of the BDA’s 
archaeology department to immediately desist from issuing any further § 11 (1) permits for 
applications for surveys which meet this condition. The same e-mail also indicates that the BDA’s 
official Guidelines41 will be changed in due course and I have been assured that this change in policy 
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and practice will be appropriately communicated to both the archaeological community and the 
Austrian public. 
That said, while this is clearly a significant change in policy, its actual effects in practice will be 
limited. While I know that § 11 (1) permits have indeed been occasionally issued for surface surveys; 
it is evident (also from the FÖ) that this happens very rarely. Its main effect in practice will be on 
community archaeologists, who want to conduct surface surveys, and who may now do so freely 
without fear of prosecution. While this will benefit the woeful state of the land survey in Austria,42 
whether it will significantly improve it is questionable. After all, cases against such community 
archaeologists were rarely brought by the BDA in the past, and thus the deterrent effect of this is 
unlikely to have been significant. 
The second case, however, should have much more significant consequences, not just on policy, but 
also on practice. Nevertheless, it is concerning that the BDA seems to have taken no steps so far to 
implement the findings of the VwGH. This is proven beyond any reasonable doubt by the first case: 
since the findings in the second predate the application which led to the first, the need to bring the 
first should never have arisen. Had the BDA implemented the findings of the VwGH, it would have 
had to decline my application due to its evident lack of jurisdiction. That it did not, despite the clarity 
of the legal situation, implies that something is amiss. At the very least, it inspires little confidence in 
the BDA’s capability to lawfully dispense its duties. This is particularly important in light of recent 
criticism of the BDA’s (lack of) competence regarding the dispensation of its legal duties by the 
Austrian Court of Audit (Rechnungshof).43  
At any rate, even in the ‘best case’, the BDA will have to change its policy and practice significantly. 
After all, the provisions of § 11 (1) are certainly inapplicable to fieldwork on c. 99% of the Austrian 
landmass44 where no archaeology is known or suspected to exist. This would have only limited 
impact on professional archaeological fieldwork. Compliance with the BDA’s Guidelines only 
becomes compulsory when subject to the permit. However, since most of professional 
archaeological fieldwork happens on already known sites, in the ‘best case’ scenario, a permit would 
remain compulsory for most. Presumably, it thus would only be a small percentage – perhaps up to 
25% – of the c. 500 excavations and surveys permitted annually by the BDA in recent years45 which 
would no longer require a permit. 
However, the impact on non-professional metal detecting and, potentially, the future of 
archaeological land survey in Austria, may well be considerable. Metal detectorists can and will 
rejoice, since permit free fieldwork by anyone is now clearly legal in a large part of Austria. While 
this is unlikely to have a discernible effect on the incidence of metal detecting in Austria, it well may 
encourage at least some metal detectorists to start reporting their finds to the BDA again.46 Whilst 
resentments built up over at least the past three decades will need to calm, this may, in the long run, 
lead to a significant improvement of the archaeological land survey of Austria.47 This could be even 
more significant if supported by something similar to the Portable Antiquities Scheme [PAS].48  
In the ‘worst case’, however, the consequences would be dramatic, especially for professional 
fieldwork. Most professional fieldwork is conducted on already known or suspected, but not 
scheduled archaeological sites. Thus, in the worst case, most professional archaeological fieldwork 
will not need a § 11 (1) permit; and consequently would not be bound to comply with the 
Guidelines.49 Given that compliance with the Guidelines costs considerable amounts of money, it is 
likely that many private Austrian archaeological contractors will not comply, if only to cut costs in a 
competitive market. The worst case would mean that, in effect, quality assurance by the BDA of 
professional archaeological fieldwork in Austria would cease.  
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A further implication is that of the c. 10,000 § 11 (1) DMSG permits granted by the BDA in recent 
decades, almost all will have been issued illegally. Thus, all conditions attached to them, including 
the often costly compliance with the Guidelines50 and other permit conditions, will also have been 
illegal. If lawsuits for damages ensue as a consequence of this, it could adversely affect the 
professional relationships in Austrian archaeology and trust in the BDA and its officials. 
Where metal detecting is concerned the difference is that even more of the Austrian landmass than 
under the ‘best case’ scenario would be available to detectorists for detecting without the need for a 
§ 11 (1) permit. How much that would change detecting patterns, and thus reduce the possible 
benefits for the archaeological land survey of Austria, is debatable. 
These are serious implications for archaeological heritage management in Austria. What was 
presented as a highly restrictive legal system in its official interpretation by the BDA turned out to be 
quite liberal. Whether the changes set out above will be to the benefit or disadvantage of Austrian 
archaeology remains to be seen. 
How did it come to this? 
First, few archaeologists in Austria appear to know what the law on archaeological heritage 
protection actually says or how to correctly interpret it. This problem starts during study for an 
archaeology degree, where heritage legislation and how to interpret it in its wider legal framework is 
not taught anywhere near sufficiently much or well. This is evident from the archaeology curricula at 
Austrian Universities which regularly include heritage law and policy either only as minimal elements 
of teaching, optional modules, or not at all. If taught formally at all, it sometimes is taught by 
archaeologists who have little interest in and understanding of it. Even if – as sometimes happens – 
it is taught by an archaeologist working for a heritage agency, teaching will focus mostly on current 
policy and practice, not the law or difficulties with its interpretation and application.51 This 
impression of insufficient quantity and quality is shared in an open letter by the Association of 
Archaeology Student Unions [DASV52], circulated in 2016, in which it reiterated its demand (first 
made in 2012) that University teaching of archaeological heritage management and protection 
should urgently be improved.53  
Second, this situation seems to remain unchanged in Austria where throughout our careers we 
mostly learn formally and informally about heritage law from other archaeologists. This is evident 
from conferences and publications in which aspects of heritage law and policy are discussed: jurists 
specialised in heritage law, or indeed any jurists, hardly ever contribute to these.54 Discussions of 
heritage legislation or relevant court cases are presented by archaeologists in exceptionally short, 
descriptive pieces in archaeological journals55 or academic articles written based on interviewing 
BDA archaeologists.56 Even in advisory introductions – again written by archaeologists – for 
volunteers running local museums,57 there is no reference to specific provisions of the law, let alone 
to secondary literature like the legal commentary on the law.58 In some cases, the law has been 
misrepresented in such articles. For instance, in her short summary of changes to law and practice 
following the 1999 revision of the DMSG, the then Head of the Department of Archaeology in the 
BDA states explicitly that the systematic survey of freshly ploughed fields (for surface finds) is 
subject to the permit requirement of § 11 (1).59  
In some cases, the need for critical reflection on the underlying values and principles of 
archaeological heritage management (and thus also heritage law and policy) is deemed unnecessary 
because of the AHD: “The lack of a theoretical debate on the fundamentals of archaeological 
heritage management is due to the existence of a general consensus between all involved experts for 
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approximately two centuries”.60 Throughout our training and careers, the values underlying the 
archaeological ethos and those prominently expressed in the AHD61 – the ‘consensus’ referred to by 
Pollak62 – dominate. They affect how we perceive not just our role and construct our professional 
identity, but also how we perceive the laws directly pertaining to ‘us’. Thus, concepts like the 
archaeologist as a guardian or steward of the past for the future,63 or as an advocate for archaeology 
and its protection,64 as well as the need for technical competence in its care, particularly in 
fieldwork, and the need for permission from a public authority,65 are inculcated in students and 
reinforced in professional debates throughout our careers. 
Third, these values and concepts are further reinforced by the archaeological provisions of heritage 
law(s) themselves. After all, their archaeological content has mostly been devised by archaeologists, 
rather than by jurists or politicians.66 Thus, the values expressed and the principles included are once 
more those of the AHD, even if somewhat watered down by lobbying from other interests. Analysis 
of the laws and their provisions, often simplistic and superficial, actively supports this (even in legal 
commentaries written by heritage jurists)67. A monument protection law – as Denkmalschutzgesetz 
literally translates into English – is supposed to protect monuments and a legal prohibition against 
unpermitted fieldwork as in § 11 (1) DMSG must mean fieldwork must not be conducted without a 
permit, even if it is obvious from sub-clauses to the provision that this is not what the legislature 
intended.  
Fourth, archaeological ethics, at least in the germanophone countries, is a disciplinary rather than a 
professional ethic.68 Grossly oversimplified, the difference between these two kinds of ethics is that 
the former has the discovery of ‘the truth’69 by the academic, while the latter posits the societal 
benefit of the work of the professional as its main raison d’être.70 If discovery of ‘the truth’ is the 
main goal, it is essential that that the sources and processes of discovery are protected and their 
quality controlled. Yet it matters not whether anyone benefits; the discovery of the truth is sufficient 
of and in itself. Thus, in archaeological disciplinary ethics the only goods that are assigned a high 
value are those related to the preservation of sources. Consequently, archaeologists assign high 
values to the preservation and study of archaeology, often the highest values, in their personal 
ethics, rather than its benefits for other humans and society, and in ethical dilemmas involving 
archaeology these archaeological values will often prevail.  
Fifth, because of our academic training as archaeologists, we tend to believe that we know what is 
‘right’ where archaeology is concerned.71 This becomes apparent in debates about civil rights and 
more generally the rights of ‘the public’ to make decisions concerning archaeology. These rights, 
despite being guaranteed in both constitutional and international law,72 are often seen by 
archaeologists as secondary concerns compared to archaeological quality assurance; especially in 
the context of the non-professional extraction of archaeology ex situ73. 
Sixth, and connected to this, we also intensely feel archaeology is threatened. The whole 
conservation ethos, our heritage laws, our disciplinary values and needs, and self-perception and 
identity as guardians of the past, are all based on the feeling that ‘our heritage’ needs to be 
protected. Most of these threats we see as resulting from human activity in what could be called the 
‘long present’,74 by ‘them’: the construction industry, landowners, antiquities traders, and the self-
serving looters, who all physically threaten its preservation;75 but also the politicians, the lawyers 
and the lobbyists, whose influence and decisions may well threaten the framework in which we 
operate and the instruments which enable us to fulfil our ‘duty’ to protect archaeology. Since we are 
the expert guardians, who know what is best for ‘our heritage’, defined as a ‘common good’ both by 
the AHD and our laws, we feel morally justified to defend it against ‘them’. In that process, we see 
the law as a crucial instrument. Friedrich Lüth, for instance, when he was still Landesarchäologe 
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(state archaeologist) for Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, that is an agent of the state, expressed this 
quite explicitly when declaring that the state had to protect archaeology “…by means of the law in 
the interest of all … from the grasp of all…”.76 
Seventh, most archaeologists are concerned not with the detail of the law but with what they 
consider both legitimate and just.77 We are concerned with heritage law mainly because (1) it is the 
law that pertains most directly to our primary interest, and (2) because it can be used for our 
purposes. We tend to see it as a means to an end, and value it only inasmuch as it allows us to 
achieve the ends we desire. This leads to regularly expressed demands for laws perceived to be 
ineffective to be made stricter, and to be more effectively policed; even where we already over-
interpret their applicability considerably.78 
In Austria, the factors have created a situation in which archaeologists may not know what the law 
actually says, often do not fully understand it, do not realise its limitations, or appreciate it as 
society’s principal means of ensuring an equitable reconciliation between different interests. Instead 
it is seen primarily as a means to achieve an end. What that end should be is determined by our 
values and interests, which lead us to believe that we know what is best for archaeology; that it is 
threatened by the actions of others; that we have been assigned the duty by society to protect it 
against these threats; and that, for these reasons, we are entitled to decide the fate of this ‘common 
good’ in the interest of everyone, if necessary against the interests of anyone. In other words, we 
believe our cause is just. 
Consequently, if we believe our cause is just, but the aims we try to achieve conflict with the law, it 
is tempting to believe the law is wrong.79 Thus, whether consciously or subconsciously, we search for 
ways to make the wrong law right. Ideally, this should be done by changing the law, and that’s often 
what we (try) to do if we can. But if we cannot, we sometimes feel forced to find another way to 
make it right. For instance, we start reading the law ever more selectively; or indeed start to stretch 
our interpretation of it. In effect, if the law does not quite fit with our expectations, and cannot be 
changed, we simply make it fit through administrative practice. 
This process is evident in how the BDA has interpreted the DMSG, and particularly § 11 (1), over the 
last few decades. I have explained how and why the provisions of § 11 (1) were changed in its 1990 
revision because a metal detectorist got away at the Supreme Court with extracting eight Roman 
coins ex situ by claiming that he had merely collected them as surface finds.80 Thus, we changed this 
archaeologically unfit provision, which stated that a permit was required just for “excavations”, and 
added to it the clause “and any other research in situ”. Unfortunately, this rephrasing was spotted, 
quite possibly by some jurist concerned that this could extend its applicability to any attempt to find 
anything, who restricted its applicability again by adding “beneath the surface of the ground or 
water”, thwarting our efforts.  
Thus, an alternative was sought. The BDA started, ever so slightly, to misread the letter of the law by 
reading into § 11 (1) the very wide term Bodendenkmale, defined in § 8 (1) as any object which 
“could be subject to the restrictions of this law”, where the law actually uses the much narrower 
term Denkmale, defined in § 1 (1) as significant objects whose preservation is in the public interest. 
This, with one fell swoop, appeared to bring all metal detecting under the prohibition of § 11 (1) 
against unpermitted fieldwork. Clearly that was already, as the finding of the VwGH discussed above 
proves beyond any reasonable doubt, a significant misinterpretation of the law.  
Then, mission creep set in. I cannot say precisely when the BDA started to try to bring plain surface 
surveys under the provisions of § 11 (1), nor the reasons why it did so. It may well be that some 
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metal detectorist, whose lawyer had found the 1985 VwGH finding, won a case in the 2nd level of 
jurisdiction, the findings of which are not normally published, by claiming that he had only collected 
surface finds. Or it may be that the BDA simply started to do so because some of its officials believed 
that it was what the law said, due to the misreading of its letter discussed in the previous paragraph, 
or at least believed that that was what it should say.81 It is unlikely that the BDA applied the law this 
way consistently by 2008, because in that year, it still published a lengthy report by an amateur 
archaeologist about his surface surveys in Lower Austria in the FÖ,82 without reporting him to the 
prosecuting authority for allegedly violating § 11 (1). But at the latest by 2012, it did list surface 
surveys as research requiring a § 11 (1) permit in its 2nd edition of its Guidelines.83 Of course, this was 
even more obviously illegal, as the BVwG finding discussed above conclusively proves. Yet no one 
complained (successfully) until I did.  
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? 
Which brings me to my final point. The BDA has maintained its position for at least 26 years because 
there is no internal or external oversight. There are the courts, and appeals are possible through 
several levels of jurisdiction, as the findings of the BVwG and VwGH discussed in this paper 
demonstrate. However, as the evidence above suggests, decisions are rarely appealed, except in 
relation to scheduling. Judicial oversight in practice, therefore, is limited. Where the provisions of § 
11 (1) DMSG are concerned, there are only three court judgements in over 30 years: that of the 
BVwG in the case I brought myself, the VwGH finding discussed above, and the finding of the VwGH 
dated 24.6.1985, case no: 84/12/0213. 
Importantly, although the Austrian Court of Audit has heavily criticised the BDA for various 
managerial issues,84 archaeologists outside the BDA are reluctant to challenge the official body. 
Instead, the community mostly seems to act as an echo chamber, confirming to the archaeologists in 
the BDA that their interpretation of the law is acceptable. Despite complaints by archaeologists in 
the past regarding the granting of excavation permits and the conditions attached to them, to the 
best of my knowledge, none have been challenged in the courts. 
Lastly, ordinary citizens, hobby archaeologists, and metal detectorists, mostly simply ignore the BDA. 
The risk of prosecution and a fine of c. €500 is minimal, and the need for expensive legal advice for 
appeals sufficient to put off all but the most determined from challenging the BDA, even if they are 
caught and fined. Thus, the BDA remains largely unchallenged.  
Beyond Austria 
The situation outlined above, that heritage agencies sometimes considerably overstep the bounds of 
their legal authority, is not limited to Austria alone.  
The German state of Hesse, in its Denkmalschutzgesetz [HDSchG], also has a provision which states 
“Research, especially excavation, with the aim of discovering Bodendenkmäler, requires permission 
by the Technical Authority for Monuments” (§ 22 HDSchG 2016; previously § 21 HDSchG 2012).85 The 
Denkmalfachbehörde (Technical Authority for Monuments) is the Landesamt für Denkmalpflege 
Hessen [LfDH], specifically its department for archaeology, the hessenARCHÄOLOGIE. Like the 
Austrian BDA, it attaches Guidelines86 to any fieldwork permits and compliance with them is a legally 
binding obligation. 
When I examined them closely in 2016, the Guidelines on the Landesamt für Denkmalpflege Hessen 
website included a rather surprising statement in chapter “I. Area of applicability of the Guidelines”: 
“For excavations in the land of Hesse, which are based on a research permit according to § 21 
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HDSchG or a monument law permission according to § 16 HDSchG, the rights to analyse the finds and 
publication rights lie with the Landesamt für Denkmalpflege Hessen.” (emphasis: RK).87  
This is important for two reasons: (1) all archaeological excavations conducted in Hesse by parties 
other than the LfDH (which according to the commentary to, but not the letter of, the HDSchG is 
exempt)88 require such a permit; and (2) all publication rights according to § 12 (1) German 
Urheberrechtsgesetz ([UrHG], Intellectual Property Rights Law) are property of the author of the 
original work of art or science. The UrHG applies also to written and photographic works as well as 
illustrations of scientific or technical nature such as drawings, plans, maps, sketches, tables as 
defined in its § 2 (1). According to its § 15 (1-2), their author has the exclusive (but transferrable 
according to its § 31) right to publish them. Thus, this appears to be a dispossession of 
archaeologists of their intellectual property by the state of Hesse. 
Art. 14 (3) Grundgesetz [GG], the constitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany, while 
allowing for the dispossession of property of individuals by the state for the public good, requires 
any such dispossession to be based on a law which determines fair compensation. While this may be 
included in the HDSchG 2016 the form of §§ 26 (1.2) and 27 (§§ 25 (1.2) and 26 HDSchG 2012 
respectively), neither §§ were quoted in the Guidelines.89 Nor were these §§ cited in copies of 
permits I have seen, which included an identical statement to the one quoted above as a separately 
itemised condition.90 Moreover, there also was no indication that the legal owners of any IP 
(according to § 2 (1) UrHG) created during any permitted fieldwork in Hesse were actually 
compensated according to the provisions of the HDSchG, or that compensation had ever been 
discussed with any of them. 
This condition in fieldwork permits by the LfDH thus appears to have been contrary to the law. In 
permits applied between 1/8/2015 and 12/1/2017, the LfDH appears to have dispossessed 
professional archaeologists of their intellectual property without paying them the legally required 
fair compensation.91 
To address this problem, I wrote a strongly worded letter to the state archaeologist for Hesse, 
arguing in detail why I considered this to be illegal, and demanded that policy and practice be 
changed. Subsequently the LfDH fulfilled my demand and changed its Guidelines immediately, 
backdating them to 1/1/2017, though published online only on 17/1/2017.92 
This is relevant in the context of this paper as colleagues working in Hesse were concerned at the 
appropriation of publication rights by the LfDH. Much like my Austrian colleagues, few complained, 
formally; and like in Austria, effective internal or external oversight of the LfDH appears to be 
lacking. Despite a clear legal framework it is clear that some heritage agencies may misinterpret the 
law to their own advantage.  
Conclusions 
This paper has shown that heritage agencies in Austria and Hesse do not always correctly apply the 
heritage laws they are supposed to execute. In both Austria and Hesse, it is not just administrative 
mistakes that lead to the law being incorrectly applied. Rather, it is in and due to heritage 
management practice that misapplication of the law can be systematic, wide-ranging, and affect 
almost every decision (at least in particular matters) an agency has issued over the course of years, if 
not several decades.  
In Austria, interpretation of the Austrian Administrative Supreme Court finding discussed above 
(VwGH on 23.2.2017, case no: Ro 2016/09/0008) means that over the past c. 30 years, many 
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fieldwork permits were issued by the BDA to professional archaeologists illegally. This may have 
financial consequences and have damaged the reputation of the heritage management sector in 
Austria.  
It may also mean that despite the BDA’s position, the law requires fieldwork permits only on 
scheduled sites, similar to the ‘British’ model. The implication is that the Austrian legal situation does 
not correspond to the ‘German’ model of subjecting all fieldwork to a state permit requirement. 
Rather, the fieldwork permit requirement of § 11 (1) DMSG extends, at most, to land where there 
already exists evidence that significant archaeology is probably present.  
The findings of the Austrian Federal Administrative Court of Appeals (BVwG on 11.9.2017, case no: 
W183 2168814-1/2E) also indicate that the BDA has misapplied the law. The ramifications are 
significant for professional archaeology in Austria and for the Austrian public. The problems 
regarding the consequences of § 11 (1) DMSG related to finds reporting and the possibility of an 
archaeological land survey of Austria93 were not problems caused by the law itself but through the 
BDA’s misinterpretation and misapplication of the law. The poor state of both finds reporting by 
members of the public and the archaeological land survey of Austria are a direct consequence of the 
heritage management policies and practices of the BDA. The problem resulting from this is that 
metal detectorists always had leave to engage in their hobby almost anywhere in Austria, because in 
most places, their activity is not prohibited at all. This could potentially be turned, at least 
somewhat, to the benefit of archaeology and the archaeological land survey of Austria, but only if it 
accompanied by introducing a system comparable to the UK’s Portable Antiquities Scheme, which as 
of yet is lacking in Austria. 
In Hesse the appropriation of publication rights to fieldwork records produced by third party 
professional archaeologists by the LfDH served to show that the issue of heritage agencies 
misinterpreting the law is not just an Austrian problem. In previous papers94 I have warned that 
archaeologists might be over-interpreting and over-extending the applicability of ‘our’ heritage laws, 
and be significantly overstepping the bounds of their authority. As the cases discussed in this paper 
demonstrate, this is now an established fact. In practice, such misinterpretation is due to a potent 
mix of limited knowledge, poor understanding and appreciation of the law and a bias characteristic 
of the authorised heritage discourse.95 This can lead to misapplication of the law in administrative 
practice, exacerbated by the lack of judicial challenge and ineffective governance, whether within 
government agencies or by the discipline of archaeology as a whole.  
Lessons to be learned 
The situation in Austria and Hesse which I have detailed is a strong reminder that it is only once 
issues have been identified that legal remedies to deal with them can be formulated. We can learn 
from this that in some cases, we may have to try to change the law. In others, we may have 
approach problems somewhat differently than before. For instance, in Hesse, it might be possible to 
use the provisions of §§ 26 (1.2) and 27 HDSchG 2016 to legally dispossess, provided fair 
compensation is paid, the original owners of IPR in fieldwork records of their publication rights, if 
that be deemed necessary. In yet other cases, we may have to accept that what we want is not 
achievable within the bounds of the law; and will have to find voluntary solutions for minimizing the 
damage and maximising any potential benefits of legally permitted activities for the archaeology. 
This is what England and Wales have done with the PAS; and the BDA in Austria may have to do the 
same, or try to assure the quality of fieldwork freely permitted by law by training as many members 
of the public as are interested in professional archaeological excavation and recording. 
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The most important lessons to be learned from this paper, however, is that we must not try to 
achieve our aims by simply disregarding the law. Rather, we have to find legal ways to achieve them. 
Whether we like it or not: like everyone else, we also have to obey the law, since this is necessary if 
we do not want to have final judgement in the courts go against us. 
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